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CORPORATIONS-SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-RULE 10b-5-
FRAUD-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a
cause of action under rule 10b-5 must be based on conduct that
could be considered manipulative or deceptive; breach of fiduciary
duty without deceit is not fraud under the rule.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
By July, 1974, Santa Fe Industries had acquired a 95% interest
in Kirby Lumber Corporation.' Santa Fe then executed a short-form
merger in accordance with Delaware law,' without prior notification
to the minority stockholders of Kirby and without an apparent busi-
ness purpose other than the removal of the minority interest. After
the merger, Santa Fe offered the minority stockholders $150 per
share for their holdings, 3 and provided them with complete informa-
tion about the merger plan and full financial details.'
1. Sixty percent of the Kirby stock was acquired in 1936 by Santa Fe Natural Resources,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Santa Fe Industries. Subsequent purchases increased ownership
until 95% of the Kirby stock was controlled by Santa Fe Resources, which transferred the
stock to Forest Products, Inc. (another Santa Fe Industries subsidiary) in exchange for all of
Forest Products' stock. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 465-66 (1977).
2. The board of Forest Products approved a merger with Kirby, stating that a "new"
Kirby would be the surviving entity. Stockholders of the "old" Kirby were asked to submit
their shares for cash. Id. Delaware corporation law permitted a parent corporation owning at
least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary by means of the "short-
form" process. Advance notice was not required, but notification within 10 days of the effec-
tive merger date was necessary. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975). A dissatisfied shareholder's
only remedy was to petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for a judicially supervised
appraisal. Id. § 262. The judicial interpretation of this statute leaves little doubt that its
purpose was to benefit the corporation, not the minority shareholder. See Stauffer v. Stan-
dard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (purpose of short-form merger
was to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's
interest); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(purpose of short-form merger was to simplify the procedure for mergers of parent corpora-
tions and subsidiaries). This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the notion that
minority stockholders do not have a vested right to remain shareholders of a corporation. See
Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d 785 (Ch. 1958), aff'd 38
Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
3. An appraisal was conducted by the investment banking firm of Morgan, Stanley &
Company which was accused of participation in the fraud. The appraisal was based upon
financial statements of the five previous years and forecasts for the next five years. It also
included evaluation of property and mineral rights as well as an adjustment for the assump-
tion that the shares would be broadly distributed and freely traded. The final figure arrived
at by Morgan Stanley was $125 per share. 430 U.S. at 466.
4. Id. Stockholders were also notified of their right to seek judicially supervised appraisal.
See note 2 supra.
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The minority stockholders objected to the offer and, rather than
pursuing their state remedy of a judicially supervised appraisal,
brought an action in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York,' charging violations of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19346 and rule 10b-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).7 The minority stockholders
argued first that their shares were so grossly undervalued as to con-
stitute fraud under rule 10b-5. s Secondly, they asserted that, be-
cause the merger was accomplished without prior notice and for the
sole purpose of eliminating the minority interest, the merger itself
should be considered a violation of rule 10b-5.1 No misrepresen-
tation or failure to disclose relevant facts, however, was claimed.'"
5. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd in part, 533
F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (reinstating district court decision).
6. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) [hereinafter
referred to as section 10(b)] provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as rule 10b-5 or rule] provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
8. 391 F. Supp. at 852. The plaintiffs argued that the $125 per share appraisal of Morgan
Stanley drastically understated the value of Kirby stock and that the corporation, knowing
this, committed fraud when they offered only $150 per share to the minority stockholders.
Based upon a pro rata evaluation of Kirby's assets, plaintiffs calculated a price per share of
at least $772. Id. at 852-53.
9. Id. The plaintiffs contended that rule 10b-5, through its anti-fraud provisions, required
prior notification. Also, plaintiffs asserted that the majority, by forcing the minority to sell
their stock against their will without a valid business purpose, fraudulently acquired the
minority interest.
10. No appellate decision before Santa Fe and Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded for mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), had explicitly
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The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a
cause of action under federal securities laws. Since full and fair
disclosure was made, the alleged inadequacy of the offering price
was not sufficient to support a claim under the rule. The court also
rejected the shareholders' second argument, pointing out that Dela-
ware corporation law required neither prior notification of a short-
form merger nor the presence of a business purpose. In the absence
of a state requirement, rule 10b-5 would not demand notification or
business purpose, and, in the absence of actual fraud or deceit, the
court would not analyze the motives of corporate directors."
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the case was reversed in part." The court corrected the
generally held "erroneous assumption" that misrepresentation or
lack of disclosure was needed to allege a claim under rule 10b-5."
While acknowledging that the rule was obviously intended to pre-
vent fraud in the classic sense, the court held that the rule also
encompassed any "breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or con-
fidence."' 4 The court of appeals could find no justifiable business
purpose in the merger of Santa Fe and Kirby and construed this to
be a breach of the majority shareholders' fiduciary duty. 5 This
breach was held to be a violation of rule 10b-5, even though no
deceit was found.'6
rejected the nondisclosure or misrepresentation requirements as necessary elements in a cause
of action under rule 10b-5. See 89 HARv. L. REv. 1917 (1976).
11. 391 F. Supp. at 852. As authority for this position the court cited Grimes v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,722 (N.D.
Fla. 1974) (minority shareholder's request for a permanent injunction barring merger that
would force him to accept cash for his shares was denied).
12. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The dismissal of the complaint
against Morgan Stanley for failure to show misrepresentation or participation in the merger
was affirmed.
13. Id. at 1286. The court pointed out that only rule 10b-5(b) discussed fraudulent prac-
tices in terms of nondisclosure and misrepresentation. As the court interpreted the entire rule,
subdivisions (a) and (c) expanded the concept of fraud to actions other than a failure to fully
disclose or truthfully represent.
14. 533 F.2d at 1290, citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194
(1963).
15. The majority has the right to control the corporation but it owes a fiduciary duty to
the minority. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 240 (2d ed. 1970); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L. REv. 903 (1975).
16. 533 F.2d at 1291. The court stated that whether excessively low valuation alone would
support a cause of action under rule 10b-5 was not the case before it. Id. Apparently, the
court preferred to treat the question of undervaluation as one aspect of the broader issue of
breach of fiduciary duty.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'7 and, in its
subsequent opinion, emphasized the importance of this case to the
administration of the federal securities laws.'8 The Supreme Court
accepted the district court decision that undervaluation of the
shares of minority stockholders alone would not support a complaint
under rule 10b-5.'9 The Court, however, reversed the court of ap-
peals, finding instead that the Santa Fe short-form merger was
neither manipulative nor deceptive under federal regulations, 0 and
holding that rule 10b-5 could only be applied in instances of actual
manipulation or deception.2'
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice White first focused
on the language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. He emphasized the
statute's use of the words "manipulative or deceptive" in conjunc-
tion with "device or contrivance" 2 to underscore the Court's holding
that rule 10b-5, as a derivative of section 10(b), could not be pre-
sumed to apply where deception or manipulation did not exist.3
Since neither the district court nor the court of appeals found any
omission or misstatement in the information provided to the minor-
ity stockholders by Santa Fe Industries, the merger was not accom-
plished through deception. The Supreme Court then rejected the
proposition that a breach of fiduciary duty, without any deception,
would violate rule 10b-5. 24  The Court recognized that
''manipulation" as used in this statutory context was a "term of
art" referring to practices intended to mislead investors by artifi-
17. 429 U.S. 814 (1976).
18. 430 U.S. at 471.
19. Id. True and complete information had been given to the stockholders of Kirby. This
would have allowed them to decide whether to accept the offered price or to bring an action
in state court for appraisal. If, as the Court indicated, the purpose of § 10(b) was to promote
full disclosure, then the legal duty of the corporation to the minority shareholders under the
federal law had been met once complete information was made available.
20. Id. at 476. By implication,' at least under Delaware law and similar statutes in other
states, prior notification of short-form merger is not required and forced sale through merger
is permitted if full disclosure is made.
21. Id. at 474.
22. See note 6 supra.
23. 430 U.S. at 472. The requirement that a device or contrivance be manipulative or
deceptive set the limits for rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) gives the SEC the power to prescribe
rules as necessary, but only to give effect to the statute, not to make new law. Consequently,
the scope of rules such as 10b-5 cannot exceed that of the supporting statute. See Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scope of rule 10b-5 cannot exceed authority granted
under §10(b)). If manipulation or deception does not exist, then § 10(b) does not apply; and
if § 10(b) does not apply, then rule 10b-5 is not applicable.
24. 430 U.S. at 476.
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cially affecting securities markets.5 Corporate mismanagement or
unfair treatment of minority shareholders by the majority, however,
was not, in the opinion of the Court, manipulation.
To marshal additional support for rejecting a section 10(b) cause
of action for breaches of fiduciary duty alone, the majority further
addressed the issues of the implied provision for a private cause of
action under section 10(b) and the traditional responsibility of the
states in regard to fiduciary standards and corporate law.2" Since
Congress had not expressly provided a private cause of action for
violations of section 10(b),27 the majority warned that one should not
be implied when unnecessary to ensure fulfillment of Congress' pur-
pose in adopting the Securities Exchange Act. Because the Act was
designed to promote full disclosure in securities transactions, 6 the
majority was especially reluctant to allow a cause of action where,
as in Santa Fe, no lack of disclosure had been claimed. The majority
also cautioned against interference with corporate regulation-an
area traditionally left to the states.2"
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in their separate concurring
opinions, agreed with the majority that the language of the statute
was dispositive, 30 but they expressed concern over the majority's
additional statement that an implied cause of action may not be
permitted to serve a merely "subsidiary purpose" of federal legisla-
tion.3 ' Justices Blackmun and Stevens believed that this line of
reasoning could cause denial of recovery under the statute for inap-
propriate reasons, for example, denial of a cause of action to reduce
the danger of vexatious litigation.2
25. Id. The key word is "artificially." The Court pointed to activities such as wash sales
and rigged prices as indicative of manipulation. Santa Fe was making use of existing market
conditions to purchase the stock; it was not attempting to artificially affect securities activity.
26. 430 U.S. at 477.
27. A private cause of action is recognized under § 10(b). See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (violation of rule lOb-5 gave rise to a private cause of
action although no express provision was made for civil liability).
28. 430 U.S. at 477. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(philosophy of full disclosure substituted for philosophy of caveat emptor).
29. 430 U.S. at 479. The majority was concerned that federal fiduciary standards estab-
lished under rule 10b-5 would likely depart from existing state standards, and that the law
of securities transactions would be federalized, impinging on much of the state's domain.
They were unwilling to go so far absent clear congressional intent.
30. Id. at 480.
31. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (cause of action must be consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme).
32. Justice Blackmun pointed to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
1977-78
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The competing interests before the Court were well defined. The
corporate defendant desired to conduct business under existing
state laws without fear of judicially created federal liability. On the
other hand, investors, realizing that the legislature could not antici-
pate every variation of fraud, needed assurance that their interests
would not be subject to the comparative ingenuity of lawmakers
against thieves, or to the whim of a majority of corporate directors.
Into this controversy the Court injected issues of the right to private
action under federal securities law and the traditional sovereignty
of states in corporate matters. To properly balance these claims, the
Court examined statutory language, legislative intent, and previous
cases.
Case law revealed a continually broadening definition of fraud
under rule 10b-5. In initially applying the rule, the courts adopted
a common law fraud analysis.3 The common law approach had
limited usefulness, however, when dealing with securities transac-
tions; elements of fraud were difficult to prove and some important
situations, such as partial disclosure, were excluded from the ambit
of the rule.34 To accomplish the full disclosure purpose of securities
regulation, courts realized that a more flexible interpretation of
fraud was needed.35 Furthermore, it became apparent that corporate
(1975) (plaintiff excluded as not a purchaser or seller within meaning of statute), and Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (statute and rule confined to situation where
defendant has intent to deceive) as examples of the restrictive interpretation of rule 10b-5
that preclude recovery. Justice Stevens added Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)
(plaintiff excluded because injury was not of the type sought to be avoided by statute).
33. The elements of common law fraud are: misrepresentation of a material fact, state-
ments that are knowingly false, an intent to deceive the plaintiff, reliance, and damages
caused by the deception. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 531, 537, 546 (1938).
34. Courts had difficulty finding an intent to deceive, reliance, and the fact that the
person injured was the person who was intended to be deceived. In addition, there were
questions concerning the applicability of the law to situations involving half truths and
complete omissions by those involved in securities transactions. See 145 CORPORATE LAW AND
PRACTICE ch. 1.
35. Initially, courts held that rule 10b-5 was applicable only where the fraud was asso-
ciated with the sale or purchase of securities. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (current stockholders were not within the
class of buyers or sellers and could not bring an action). By expanding the definition of
purchase and sale, however, the courts were able to bring under rule 10b-5 activities such as
forced sale by short-form merger. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (shareholder forced to give up stock as a result of short-form
merger deemed a "seller"). Courts were also willing to apply rule 10b-5 when the deception
did not directly involve a purchase or sale, but was part of a larger fraudulent scheme. See,
e.g., id.; Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965) (scheme
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mismanagement could be just as devastating to stockholders with
full disclosure as without. 6 Thus, courts began to suggest that the
essence of rule 10b-5 might not be deception at all, but breach of
fiduciary duty.37 No attempt had been made to abandon deception,
however, until Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.3 8 hi that case, where ma-
jority stockholders obtained corporate stock at an inordinately low
price, the court held that the minority had two bases for recovery.
One was the traditional deception of stockholders, but a second,
independent ground was suggested: improper exercise of a control-
ling influence, with no mention of deception. Commentators found
in that decision the elements of a "new fraud" for purposes of rule
10b-5.11
The court of appeals' decision in Santa Fe fit neatly into this
expansive trend, and the court was able to cite numerous cases
intimating that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 could be read broadly
enough to include within fraudulent behavior the abuse of fiduciary
culminating in merger was "in connection with the purchase or sale" for purposes of the rule).
Frequently, when courts venture beyond the literal applications of legislation and into the
"gray areas," case law yields some conflicting interpretations. In Ruckle v. Roto American
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), where the majority of the board of directors withheld
information from remaining directors, the court held rule 10b-5 had been violated since fraud
had been perpetrated upon the corporation. Shortly afterward, the same court decided
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) and held no liability under rule 10b-5 because
all directors knew of the plan and therefore there was no deception. If it can be presumed
that rule 10b-5 was expanded to protect investors, it seems strange that the rule could protect
their interests only when the full board of directors was not involved in the offending activity.
36. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals initially refused to apply rule 10b-5 to corporate
mismanagement. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967). In dicta, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that rule 10b-5 "imposes
broad fiduciary duties on management vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual sharehold-
ers." McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961).
37. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (district court reluctantly inter-
preted court of appeals decisions as indicating that breach of fiduciary duty alone will support
claim under rule lOb-5).
The relationship between rule 10b-5 and minority shareholder interests came into focus
with the "decision-making body" theory. See Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250
F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966) (relevant data must be disclosed to decision-making body);
Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law,
55 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1969) [hereinafter cited as "New Fraud']. This theory was based on
the recognition that the minority really had no power to prevent a course of action agreed
upon by the majority. Even with rule 10b-5, the helpless minority interest was still helpless,
and thus the seeds of the current controversy were sown. Courts, aware of the potential for
abuse of the minority interest by the majority, even without deception, were searching for a
method of prevention. Rule 10b-5 was the apparent choice.
38. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
39. See, e.g., "New Fraud", supra note 37, at 1103.
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responsibility without deception." The real issue, however, was not
whether the case law development justified the result, but whether
this expanded concept of fraud was within the boundaries estab-
lished by Congress in section 10(b).
In determining that rule 10b-5 had been overextended, the Su-
preme Court correctly concentrated on the underlying statute."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,42 decided only one year before Sante
Fe, reiterated the fundamental premise that the statute must con-
trol the interpretation of the rule. The language in section 10(b) in
no way indicates that the section was meant to prohibit conduct not
involving manipulation or deception. Legislative history is sparse
and generally inadequate to support an attempt to extend the scope
of the statute.43 Thus, the Court properly concluded that a com-
plaint states a cause of action under any part of rule 10b-5 only if
the conduct alleged could be viewed as "manipulative or decep-
tive". The rule should not be applied to resolve tangential issues of
fairness.4
40. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d Cir. 1976) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In the court of appeals' evaluation, Schoenbaum
"broke new ground" by holding that abuse of fiduciary responsibility could support an action
under rule 10b-5 even though the technical niceties of common law fraud had not been met.
Id. at 1296. The decision was hailed as a recognition of the special vulnerability of minority
shareholders to activities such as short-form mergers. See "New Fraud", supra note 37, at
1117. Nevertheless, evidence of deception was present in that case, so the link to the statutory
language of § 10(b) still existed. In support of the abandonment of misrepresentation, Judge
Mansfield stated in Santa Fe that whatever deception had been found in the supporting cases
had little relevance to the conduct giving rise to the liability. It was the breach of fiduciary
duty owed to the minority stockholders, and not some minor deception, that was of concern.
533 F.2d at 1299.
41. The court of appeals also discussed rule 10b-5, but failed to look to § 10(b) to ascertain
the framework for the operation of the rule. 533 F.2d at 1287. Thus, the court did not consider
the limiting language of § 10(b).
42. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
43. 430 U.S. at 473 n.13. The Court pointed out that the intended scope of § 10(b) was
not explicitly revealed in the legislative history of the 1934 Act. The only specific reference
in the Senate Report indicated that it was aimed at manipulative and deceptive practices
fulfilling no useful function. However, even in that brief statement, the words "manipulative"
and "deceptive" are controlling. Various commentators have examined the legislative history
of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 with specific reference to the court of appeals' decision in Santa
Fe. See, e.g., Banoff, Fraud Without Deceit, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1977) (history and
administrative construction do not support court's decision); Rosenfeld, An Essay in Support
of the Second Circuit Decision in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, 5 HOFSTRa L. REv. 111 (1976) (decision correctly reflects underlying purpose of
federal securities laws).
44. The Court relied on Ernst & Ernst as support for holding that, when the statute spoke
specifically of manipulation and deception, it should not be extended in scope by the Court
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Despite the broad language in the opinions of the cases relied
upon by the court of appeals in Sante Fe, each breach of fiduciary
duty held violative of rule 10b-5 had involved some element of de-
ception.45 Anticipating such an attack on the validity of the court's
rationale, Judge Mansfield argued that recognition of misrepresen-
tation as the basis of liability in those cases exalted form over sub-
stance, in that breach of fiduciary duty had always been the basis
of liability." A more accurate analysis reveals that the courts had
been willing to accept minimal instances of deception to give rule
10b-5 as wide a coverage of fraudulent securities practices as possi-
ble, while remaining within the constraints of section 10(b). 7 The
Supreme Court's decision in Sante Fe implicitly acknowledged this
and served as an indication that an outer boundary had been
reached in the expansion of rule 10b-5.
As the concurring justices warned, the potential for restrictive
interpretation of rule 10b-5 in light of the Sante Fe decision cer-
tainly exists, but the rule had been overextended, and a decision to
assert some control over its expansion should not be viewed as an
attempt to foreclose legitimate claimants. It must be remembered
that the fundamental purpose of section 10(b) is full disclosure in
securities transactions, not a monitoring of the fairness of the bar-
gain." An implied private cause of action under section 10(b) is only
acceptable if necessary to implement the purpose of the statute.
Rule 10b-5, therefore, should not become the universal remedy for
without some proof of congressional intent. 430 U.S. at 473-74.
45. Judge Moore, dissenting in the court of appeals decision, highlighted the instances of
deception in cases relied upon by the majority. 533 F.2d at 1301.
46. Id. at 1299. Judge Mansfield undoubtedly believed that the finding of deception in
those cases was irrelevant. The "substance" of the violation was the breach of a fiduciary duty
and this should not have been obscurred by an attempt to locate minor instances of deception.
47. Gaps in federal securities regulations left various practices uncovered. See notes 34-
36 and accompanying text supra. Initially, the courts attacked the problems by broadly
interpreting rule 10b-5. See notes 35-37 supra. However, a rule can only be stretched as far
as the outside edges of the supporting legislation. When these limits are reached, other
solutions must be sought.
Proposed SEC Regulations indicate that existing legislation is inadequate to meet the
problems uncovered in Santa Fe. See Proposed Rule 13e-3B(a), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
22.705 (1975) (elimination of minority unlawful without valid business purpose); Proposed
Rule 13e-3A(c)(1), id. at 22,704 (prior notification of minority stockholders required under
short-form merger); and Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(2), id. (price to be paid to stockholders
must exceed the value placed on securities by two qualified independent persons).
48. The Court noted that the fairness of the transaction was merely a "tangential con-
cern." 430 U.S. at 478.
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inequities suffered by minority stockholders. Rather than straining
the rule to establish national standards of fairness, available state
remedies should be pursued. The Santa Fe majority's apprehension
that extension of rule 10b-5 into new areas of fiduciary misconduct
would interfere with state law demonstrates the Court's preference
for state action.
The immediate significance of the Supreme Court's decision is
evident in the Court's refusal to accept a further expansion of the
meaning of "fraud" under rule 10b-5. In reaffirming the require-
ment that deception be the basis of a claim of fraud, the Court has
defined the limits of one dimension of the rule's expanding applica-
bility." The Court has provided corporations with greater security
in transacting business according to state statutes and has given to
all parties a clearer conception of what conduct will be subject to
the sanctions of section 10(b). The decision can also be viewed as
indicating a willingness to limit the role of rule 10b-5 in situations
where established business practices permitted by state law, such
as the short-form merger without notice found in Sante Fe, may be
unfair to minority investors though neither manipulative nor decep-
tive. This is not a question of returning power to the states or cur-
tailing the proper exercise of rule 10b-5, but an admission that
existing federal laws do not cover all aspects of corporate behavior.
Minority stockholders desiring relief from those unfair practices not
legitimately covered by federal regulation will have to seek remedial
action from the legislature or existing state statutes rather than
from the federal judiciary.
Robert G. Devlin
49. It should be emphasized that defining fraud is only one aspect of controlling rule lOb-
5. Virtually every phrase in the rule has been litigated. See 145 CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
ch. 1.
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